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INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE BRIDGE
TO INTERNATIONAL JUSTICEt
by Wayne L. Morse*
T HE UNITED STATES SENATE, on July 28, 1945, by a vote of
eighty-nine to two, passed the Resolution of Ratification of
the Charter of the United Nations with the Statute of the Inter-
national Court of Justice annexed thereto. The treaty had been
formulated at the United Nations Conference on International
Organization, in San Francisco, and signed on June 26, 1945.
President Truman, speaking in San Francisco at the signing ses-
sion, said in part:
The Charter of the United Nations which you are now
signing is a solid structure upon which we can build for
a better world. History will honor you for it. Between the
victory in Europe and the final victory in Japan, in this most
destructive of all wars, you have won a victory against war
itself.
If we had had this charter a few years ago-and, above
all, the will to use it-millions now dead would be alive. If
we should falter in the future in our will to use it, millions
now living will surely die.
By their own example the strong nations of the world
should lead the way to international justice. That principle
of justice is the foundation stone of this charter. That prin-
ciple is the guiding spirit by which it must be carried out-
not by words alone but by continued concrete acts of good
will.
The time for action is here and now. Let us, therefore,
each in his own nation and according to its own way, seek
immediate approval of this charter-and make it a living
thing.1
The United Nations Charter, with its Statute of the Inter-
national Court of Justice, offers mankind's best hope of attaining
a world order of permanent peace through the substitution of the
peaceful policies and procedures of International Justice for the
jungle law of military might. The preamble to the Charter reads:
t Based on an address by the Honorable Wayne L. Morse on April 30, 1970,
in the observance of Law Day at The University of Akron School of Law.
*Former United States Senator from the State of Oregon.
1 91 Cong. Rec. 6979-80 (1945).
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WE THE PEOPLES OF THE UNITED NATIONS
DETERMINED to save succeeding generations from the
scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought un-
told sorrow to mankind, and to reaffirm faith in fundamental
human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person,
in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large
and small, and to establish conditions under which justice
and respect for the obligations arising from treaties and other
sources of international law can be maintained, and to pro-
mote social progress and better standards of life in larger
freedom, and for these ends to practice tolerance and live
together in peace with one another as good neighbors, and
to unite our strength to maintain international peace and
security, and to ensure, by the acceptance of principles and
the institution of methods, that armed force shall not be
used, save in the common interest, and to employ interna-
tional machinery for the promotion of the economic and so-
cial advancement of all peoples, HAVE RESOLVED TO
COMBINE OUR EFFORTS TO ACCOMPLISH THESE
AIMS.
Accordingly, our respective Governments, through rep-
resentatives assembled in the city of San Francisco, who
have exhibited their full powers found to be in good and
due form, have agreed to the present Charter of the United
Nations and do hereby establish an international organiza-
tion to be known as the United Nations.2
The fifty nations constituting the San Francisco World Par-
liament of Nations pledged in the Charter's statement of pur-
poses and principles:
1. To maintain international peace and security, and to
that end: to take effective collective measures for the pre-
vention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the sup-
pression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace,
and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity
with the principles of justice and international law adjust-
ment or settlement of international disputes or situations
which might lead to a breach of the peace; . . .3
In fact, throughout the Charter, the signatories bound them-
selves to maintain international peace and security through
pacific settlement of disputes or, if necessary to enforce the
peace, by joint action against a wrongdoer nation, or group of
nations, in accordance with the rules and procedures proscribed
under the Charter articles.
2 91 Cong. Rec. 7119 (1945).
3 Id.
Winter 1971
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It is the major thesis of these remarks that the United Na-
tions Charter, with its Statute of the International Court of Jus-
tice, if implemented by its member nations, in keeping with the
objectives of its preamble and statement of purposes and prin-
ciples, can become a bridge to international justice leading man-
kind from the barbarism of recurrent wars to a just and perma-
nent world order of enforceable peace. As President Truman
stated (supra), "By their own example, the strong nations of the
world should lead the way to international justice. That prin-
ciple of justice is the foundation stone of this Charter."
The Charter is not a self-executing legal instrument. Its
workability for promoting international justice and world peace
will always depend upon the good-faith compliance by each of
the signatory nations to their individual and joint commitments
under the Charter. The delegates of the fifty signatory nations
knew that it would have to be tested in history's crucible of trial
and error and subjected to evolutionary changes in procedures
and policies as conflicts and controversies would arise before the
Security Council, the General Assembly, and the International
Court of Justice. They also recognized that it was the product
of many conscionable compromises of differing views among the
delegates.
Nevertheless, the fifty delegations unanimously signed the
Charter, thereby pledging to abide by their commitments under
it and to work to improve it. They recognized its potentials for
maintaining world peace through its procedures and policies of
international justice and for substituting the rule of law for war.
They knew that civilization would never survive a Third World
War which would surely be a nuclear war.
Great public interest in the Charter had developed through-
out our country by the time of its signing. Much credit is due
the press, television, radio, schools, and churches for their educa-
tional programs. Business, labor, farm, professional and civic
groups in great numbers built up a nationwide public interest
in the United Nations issue. Members of Congress came to know
very well that public opinion strongly supported the ratification
of the Charter.
On June 28, 1945, Senator Connally of Texas, the Chairman
of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and a Democratic
member of the United States Delegation to the San Francisco
Conference, reported to the Senate on the signing of the United
Nations Charter:
3
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From the dawn of modern civilization eminent men have
in vain advanced plans to eliminate the scourge of war.
Great thinkers like Dante, Grotius, William Penn, Rousseau,
Bentham, and Kant have risen to magnificent heights to
formulate charters, which, in their own times, might have
been effective designs for world peace. But these plans came
to naught, because men lacked the imagination and the dar-
ing necessary to put them into practical effect.
In 1919 the Covenant of the League of Nations was sub-
mitted to the United States Senate. It did not receive the
sanction of this body. The noble conception of that towering
leader, President Woodrow Wilson, was, however, rejected.
His exalted vision, his heroic efforts toward world peace and
his eloquent speeches in its behalf will remain indelibly in-
scribed on the annals of the centuries.
Now we are confronted with another great opportunity.
This time, however, the charter was not struck off by the
brain of a single individual. This time the charter was con-
ceived in the best tradition of American democracy. It has
been discussed for many months throughout the length and
breadth of the land. Now, finally, it has emerged in its com-
pleted form from the deliberative efforts of the representa-
tives of 50 nations met in solemn conclave.
The Atlantic Charter, the United Nations declaration,
the Moscow declaration, and the Conferences at Cairo,
Tehran, and the Crimea, together constitute a magnificent
background for the calling of the Conference at Dumbarton
Oaks and the Conference at San Francisco. These docu-
ments and the results of these Conferences express the hopes
and expectations of the United Nations. They reflect the no-
ble purposes and high objectives which we have in mind.
4
Senator Connally stressed the role of the International Court
of Justice under the Charter in the settlement of disputes in
accordance with the principles of law and justice:
The International Court of Justice constitutes the fifth
great arm or agency of the new organization. Whereas the
Security Council is primarily designed to handle political
disputes, the Court will be called upon to adjust differences
of a legal or justiciable nature. The new Court is patterned
closely after the old Permanent Court of International Jus-
tice which functioned so satisfactorily during the two dec-
ades prior to the outbreak of World War II. Jurisdiction will
be optional on the part of any party to a dispute. On the
other hand, where disputes are referred to the Court or
4 91 Cong. Rec. 6874 (1945).
Winter 1971
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where a state accepts the compulsory jurisdiction of the
Court in certain categories of cases, its decisions are, of
course, binding upon the parties. I may say here that a na-
tion may file a consent to accept the compulsory jurisdiction
of the Court in a case, as in all cases, or it may reserve that
right, and only file its consent in particular cases, or not ac-
cept the jurisdiction at all, unless it so desires.
The American people have traditionally stood for the
great ideal involved in the settlement of disputes according
to the principles of law and justice. They will, I am sure,
wholeheartedly approve the new Court as a vital and essen-
tial part of the world organization. The statute of the Court
has already received wide approval among the members of
the American Bar.5
In closing, Senator Connally stated:
The United States will not reject the clear and chal-
lenging call to this high duty. Let us rise to our lofty des-
tiny. Let us be among the architects of a structure more
marvelous than one built of steel and stone. Let us create
a temple of law and reason and justice and peace to serve
the peoples of the world.
The world charter for peace is knocking at the doors of
the Senate. We shall not turn it away.
There come ringing down through a century and a half
the inspired words of Washington as he stood before the
Constitutional Convention of 1787 and blessed the new Re-
public that was being launched upon the earth. Washington
said:
"Let us raise a standard to which the wise and the honest
can repair; the event is in the hands of God." 6
Senator Arthur Vandenberg of Michigan, then the ranking
Republican on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and a
member of the United States Delegation, made an eloquent
speech to the Senate on June 29, 1945, setting forth his report
on the United Nations Charter. In the course of the speech,
which received national acclaim, he said:
Mr. President, I have signed the San Francisco Charter.
I believe it represents a great, forward step toward the
international understanding and cooperation and fellowship
which are indispensable to peace, progress, and security. If
the spirit of its authors can become the spirit of its evolution
I believe it will bless the earth. I believe it serves the intel-
ligent self-interest of our own United States which knows,
by bitter experience in the Valley of the Shadow of two
5 Id. at 6876.
6 Id. at 6878.
5
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wars in a quarter century, that we cannot live entirely unto
ourselves alone. I believe it is our only chance to keep faith
with those who have borne the heat of battle. I have signed
the charter with no illusions regarding its imperfections and
with no pretensions that it guarantees its own benign aims;
but with no doubts that it proposes an experiment which
must be bravely undertaken in behalf of peace with justice
in a better, happier, and safer world.
I shall support the ratification of this charter with all
the resources at my command. I shall do this in the deep
conviction that the alternative is physical and moral chaos
in many weary places of the earth. I shall do it because
there must be no default in our oft-pledged purpose to out-
law aggression so far as lies within our human power. I shall
do it because this plan, regardless of infirmities, holds great
promise that the United Nations may collaborate for peace
as effectively as they have made common cause for war. I
shall do it because peace must not be cheated out of its only
collective chance.
Within the framework of the charter, through its re-
finement in the light of experience, the future can over-
take our errors. But there will be no future for it unless we
make this start. I doubt if there could ever be another or a
better start. I commend this over-all consideration to all of
my colleagues who have any interest in collective security
as an instrument of collective peace. I commend it to all
who are listening to the prayers for peace which rise from
the hearthstones of our land.
7
Senator Vandenberg agreed that the United Nations should
maintain adequate military strength for use, if necessary, to en-
force the peace, but he was firm in his convictions that using
pacific procedures for settling international disputes before they
ever reach the fighting stage offers the best hope for peace among
nations. Thus, he argued:
Certainly I do not disagree that the United Nations must
possess the potential power to fight to keep the peace which
they have won by kindred means. I agree that we must
"keep our powder dry" and be prepared to "pass the ammu-
nition." But I would not agree that force is the real genius
of this new institution. On the contrary, it is my conviction
that the great hope which is here held out to humankind
stems largely from the solemn formula which the San Fran-
cisco Charter creates for the pacific settlement of disputes
before they ever reach a fighting stage. It is my profound
belief that the pacific contacts and consultations which will
7 91 Cong. Rec. 6981-82 (1945).
Winter 1971
6
Akron Law Review, Vol. 4 [1972], Iss. 1, Art. 8
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol4/iss1/8
INTERNATIONAL LAW
constantly be maintained by the powers-and particularly
by the great powers-plus the pacific routines which every
dispute must hereafter exhaust before it is subject to any
sort of sanctions, can and will resolve most, if not all, of the
controversies which otherwise might lead once more to war.
8
What are these pacific routines to which resort must be
made by the large as well as by the small powers before
there can be any consideration, thought, or suggestion of re-
sort to force? First, solution by negotiation; second, solution
by inquiry; third, solution by mediation; fourth, solution by
conciliation; fifth, solution by arbitration; sixth, solution by
judicial settlement; seventh, solution by resort to regional
arrangements; eighth, other peaceful means chosen by the
disputants themselves; ninth, appropriate procedures or
methods of adjustment recommended by the Security Coun-
cil.9
As a result of the San Francisco Conference, Dumbarton
Oaks has been given a new soul. As originally drawn, it
avoided any reference to justice-without which there can
be no stable peace. San Francisco's Charter fills that void.
The charter names justice as the prime criterion of peace.
10
Never forget, furthermore, my thesis that the use of
force is wholly secondary to the use of the pacific tools which
this charter primarily provides. That is the vital point at
which all the United Nations stand at par. Force is only the
last resort. If needed, it obviously must be found where it
exists."
Concluding this historic speech, Senator Vandenberg said,
. . . None of its authors will certify to its perfection. But
all of its authors will certify to its preponderant advantages.
It is the only plan available for international cooperation
in the pursuit of peace and justice. It is laden with promise
and with hope. It deserves a faithful trial. America has
everything to gain and nothing to lose by giving it support;
everything to lose, and nothing to gain by declining this con-
tinued fraternity with the United Nations in behalf of the
dearest dream of humankind. I recommend the San Fran-
cisco Charter to Congress and the country.
12
8 Id. at 6982.
9 Id. at 6983.
10 Id.
11 Id. at 6984.
12 Id. at 6985 (Prolonged applause, Senators rising).
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On July 2, 1945, President Truman, in person, presented the
United Nations Treaty to the Senate and, as reported in the Con-
gressional Record, urged its prompt ratification:
I have just brought down from the White House and
have delivered to your Presiding Officer the Charter of the
United Nations. It was signed in San Francisco on June 26,
1945,-six days ago-by the representatives of 50 nations.
The statute of the International Court of Justice is annexed
to the Charter.
I am appearing to ask for the ratification of the Charter
and the statute annexed thereto, in accordance with the Con-
stitution.
The Charter which I bring you has been written in the
name of 'We, the peoples of the United Nations' (Applause)
Those peoples-stretching all over the face of the earth-will
watch our action here with great concern and high hope.
For they look to this body of elected representatives of the
people of the United States to take the lead in approving the
Charter and statute and pointing the way for the rest of the
world.
Truman continued:
The objectives of the Charter are clear.
It seeks to prevent future wars.
It seeks to settle international disputes by peaceful
means in conformity with principles of justice.
It seeks to promote world-wide progress and better
standards of living.
It seeks to achieve universal respect for, and observance
of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all men and
women-without distinction as to race, language, or religion.
It seeks to remove the economic and social causes of
international conflict and unrest.
It is the product of many hands and many influences. It
comes from the reality of experience in a world where one
generation has failed twice to keep the peace. The lessons
of that experience have been written into the document.
The choice before the Senate is now clear. The choice
is not between this Charter and something else. It is be-
tween this Charter and no charter at all.
This Charter points down the only road to enduring
peace. There is no other. Let us not hesitate to join hands
with the peace-loving peoples of the earth and start down
that road-with firm resolve that we can and will reach our
goal.
I urge ratification. I urge prompt ratification. 13
13 91 Cong. Rec. 7118-19 (1945) (Prolonged applause and standing ovation).
Winter 1971
8
Akron Law Review, Vol. 4 [1972], Iss. 1, Art. 8
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol4/iss1/8
INTERNATIONAL LAW
The legislative history of the Charter in the Senate runs
from June 28 and 29, 1945, when Senator Connally and Senator
Vandenberg made their reports. It continues through the formal
presentation of the Charter to the Senate by President Truman
on July 2, through the days of public hearings conducted by the
Foreign Relations Committee, the subsequent Senate ratification
debate starting on July 23, ending July 28, 1945, when it was rat-
ified by the Senate with only two votes against it.
Students of Constitutional and International law know that
the legislative history of a treaty, submitted under the advice
and consent clause of the Constitution, requires careful study to
attain an accurate understanding of the intent, the full meaning,
and the national commitments flowing from the language of a
treaty. The high quality of the Senate hearings and subsequent
debate on the United Nations treaty reinforces my thesis that
the Charter should become a bridge to international justice, gird-
ed by the implementation of rules and procedures of interna-
tional law.
Throughout the debate there was practically unanimous sup-
port for the treaty, with only two speeches against its ratification;
nevertheless, many of its articles were subjected to critical analy-
sis as to their alleged shortcomings as potential causes of dis-
agreements in respect to implementing and enforcing some of the
provisions of the Charter. Even those who criticized some sec-
tions of the Charter, however, joined the eighty-nine who voted
for ratification in recognizing that it offered the nations of the
world their best, possibly their last, chance to settle threats to
peace through a world parliament of nations applying and en-
forcing rules of International Law. Recall the words of Senator
Vandenberg,
... Only those who have engaged in such a universal Con-
gress-veritably the parliament of man-can wholly under-
stand the complications and the difficulties. But they must
be obvious to any thinking mind. It is no wonder we had
many a troublesome day and many a critical night. It is no
wonder that none of us can say that he wholly approves the
net result. The wonder is that we can all approve so much.
14
Several Senators, during the course of the ratification de-
bate, discussed the desirability of adopting a resolution accepting
the compulsory jurisdiction of the World Court in accordance
with the relevant provisions of Article 36 of the Statute of the
14 91 Cong. Rec. 6982 (1945).
9
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International Court of Justice which was made a part of the
United Nations Charter. Sections 1 and 2 of Article 36 of the
Court Statute read,
1. The jurisdiction of the Court comprises all cases
which the parties refer to it and all matters specially pro-
vided for in the Charter of the United Nations or in treaties
and conventions in force.
2. The states parties to the present Statute may at any
time declare that they recognize as compulsory ipso facto
and without special agreement, in relation to any other state
accepting the same obligation, the jurisdiction of the Court
in all legal disputes concerning:
a. the interpretation of a treaty;
b. any question of international law;
c. the existence of any fact which, if established, would
constitute a breach of an international obligation;
d. the nature or extent of the reparation to be made for
the breach of an international obligation.
Paragraph 6 of Article 36 reads,
In the event of a dispute as to whether the Court has
jurisdiction, the matter shall be settled by the decision of the
Court.
Senator Vandenberg explained the reasons for not including
in the Charter a binding requirement that all nations accept the
compulsory jurisdiction of the Court. He said,
[A] very large number of nations have accepted the
compulsory jurisdiction of the existing court. I am trying to
think of the number. I think it was somewhere in the neigh-
borhood of 40.
There was a very substantial opinion at San Francisco
among all delegations, very generally, favoring compulsory
jurisdiction. It was the attitude of the American delegation
that inasmuch as each time this question has heretofore been
submitted to the United States Senate the question of com-
pulsory jurisdiction has always been a stumbling block, and
there has always been a lack of willingness on the part of
the Senate to go that far as yet, it would be unfortunate to
write the court statute itself on a compulsory basis at the
present time, but that rather we should leave its development
to evolution, inasmuch as the whole process of world peace
itself is finally dependent upon evolution in the spirit and
attitude of the peoples of the earth. So we joined at San
Francisco in maintaining the optional clause in order to be
Winter 1971
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perfectly sure that at least this one needless hurdle would be
removed from Senate consideration of the charter.15
Those of us who believed that the United States should ac-
cept the compulsory jurisdiction of the World Court understood
and appreciated the explanation given by Senator Vandenberg
supporting the optional clause in the Charter. At the same time,
we felt that a record should be made in the debate by way of
serving notice that, after the ratification of the Charter, we would
seek adoption of a Senate Resolution providing for United States
acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court in accord-
ance with the option clause of paragraph 2 of Article 36 of the
Statute of the Court of International Justice. Therefore, on the
last day of the debate, July 28, 1945, I introduced Senate Reso-
lution 160 calling for the United States to accept the compulsory
jurisdiction of the Court.
The Resolution was supported by the American Bar Asso-
ciation, and many public groups and organizations interested in
a greater use of international law, through the procedures of the
World Court, for the pacific settlement of the peace-threatening
disputes among nations. Among these groups were the interna-
tional law committees of the Catholic Council of Churches, the
American Council of Christian Churches, the Association of Uni-
versity Women, and a large number of academic groups. Also
many international law authorities, such as Dr. Phillip Jessup,
Judge Manley 0. Hudson, and Dr. Quincy Wright, supported the
objective of Senate Resolution* 160. When I introduced S. Res.
160, I said,
Mr. President, the issue as between voluntary and com-
pulsory jurisdiction is the difference between shadow and
substance. Nothing whatever is gained by merely stating
that law must replace force as the governing factor of inter-
national relations. So long as states have the option of with-
holding their legal disputes from adjudication, this remains
an empty phrase, of which we have had too many in the
past .... 16
Law and order, based upon rules of reason, are the in-
struments of peace. The San Francisco Charter, in the form
of the treaty which it is our privilege as representatives of
a free people to ratify today, points the way to civilization.
Through the processes of its General Assembly, Security
* Senate Resolution hereafter referred to as S. Res.
15 91 Cong. Rec. 8108 (1945).
16 91 Cong. Rec. 8163 (1945).'
11
Morse: International Law
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1972
4 AKRON LAW REVIEW (1)
Council, Economic and Social Council, Trusteeship Council,
and World Court, rules of reason and just decisions can be
made to prevail over the primitive weapons of economic ex-
ploitation, suppression of weaker peoples, military might,
and periodic resort to war. The hour is historic, the obliga-
tion sacred, the challenge great.
In keeping faith with the hour, the obligation, and the
challenge, I offer to the Senate of the United States for early
consideration and action following ratification of the treaty
now pending before the Senate the following resolution .... 17
In the August and September 1945 issues of the American
Bar Journal, Judge Manley 0. Hudson, distinguished interna-
tional law scholar and a World Court Judge, wrote at some
length in support of Senate Resolution 160:
On the last day of the debate, it remained for Senator
Morse to make the one speech dealing at length with the
Court, and to take the only initiative in the direction of com-
pulsory jurisdiction. He had declared on July 27 that "if we
really mean to keep faith with the Charter, if we really mean
to carry out what so many have said on the Senate floor
during the past few days, we must agree to the compulsory
jurisdiction of the World Court." On July 28 he offered the
following resolution "for early consideration and action,"
S. Res. 160.1
Judge Hudson then offered some suggestions for improving
the text. On November 28, 1945, with fourteen bipartisan co-
sponsors, I introduced a revision of S. Res. 160, perfecting in na-
ture, incorporating some of the suggestions we had received from
Judge Hudson, Dr. Phillip C. Jessup, and other international law
authorities.
It was not possible to obtain Senate action on S. Res. 160
before the sine die adjournment of Congress in December, 1945.
As late as November 28, Senator Vandenberg argued against
taking up the issue of accepting the compulsory jurisdiction of
the Court:
... The viewpoint of the American delegation at San Fran-
cisco, and particularly that of the commission, was that we
did not want to jeopardize the acceptance of the basic Char-
ter by any needless controversy which could be avoided or
postponed. I personally had a very deep feeling about the
compulsory jurisdiction issue, because I so well remembered
the contest which took place here in 1936 when even on an
17 Id. at 8164.
18 Hudson, The World Court-the Next Step, 31 A.B.AJ. 443, 445 (1945).
Winter 1971
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optional jurisdiction basis I was one of only six Republicans
who were willing to vote to adhere to it. So I felt, of course,
that it was prudent to avoid that issue in connection with
the inauguration of the United Nations Organization. That
is still my point of view. The chief difference which I have
with my able friend from Oregon at the moment is that I do
not think we have yet reached the point where it is prudent
to raise that issue, because I still think that we need to get
this organization under way effectively, and to demonstrate
to the American people that it can dependably function be-
fore we undertake to expand its functions. 19
In reply to Senator Vandenberg, I said, in part,
I think I should add that I do not see how the United
Nations Organization can make effective demonstration of
its force for the pacific settlement of international disputes
unless all the members of that organization have expressed
a willingness to abide by the decisions of the judicial depart-
ment of the United Nations Organization. I find it difficult
to reconcile myself to the view that the United Nations Or-
ganization can be an effective and efficient organization with
some nations standing on the sidelines, including two great
and powerful nations, Russia and the United States, and say-
ing, 'Well, we will consider accepting the compulsory juris-
diction of the judicial branch of this Organization, after the
Organization demonstrates to us that it is an effective
organization.'
I think it is most unfortunate, Mr. President, for us to
classify ourselves in the same category with Russia as being
one of the two great nations not willing to accept the juris-
diction of the World Court in all cases which are justiciable
under international law. That does not promote interna-
tional justice nor the cause of peace.
I think the failure of this Government here and now to
accept the compulsory jurisdiction of the World Court jeop-
ardizes the effective functioning of that Court in connection
with issues which may arise between this Government and
Russia. I think the sooner we draw the issue as to whether
or not Russia will join with the United States in submitting
disputes between the United States and Russia to the com-
pulsory jurisdiction of the World Court, the better it will be,
in the interest of permanent world peace.
20
19 91 Cong. Rec. 11106 (1945).
20 Id.
13
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When the Congress reconvened in January, 1946, a subcom-
mittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, under the
chairmanship of Senator Thomas of Utah, was assigned the re-
sponsibility of conducting public hearings on S. Res. 196 which,
in the previous session of Congress, had been S. Res. 160. The
hearings were held the second week of July, 1946. Not one
dissenting voice was raised against S. Res. 196 which called for
immediate acceptance by the United States of the compulsory
jurisdiction of the World Court in terms of the provisions of the
resolution. Witnesses included the President of the American Bar
Association, distinguished lawyers, officials of the State Depart-
ment, and international law authorities. On July 25, Senator
Thomas filed the Foreign Relations Committee Report on S. Res.
196 with the Senate.
The report did not recommend that the Resolution should be
amended so as to authorize the United States to deny the World
Court jurisdiction over any dispute concerning which the United
States decided that the domestic jurisdiction of the United States
was involved. Such an amendment, which later became the Con-
nally amendment, was added to the Resolution by the Senate
during the floor debate, even though paragraph 6 of Article 36
of the Statute of the Court provides that in the event of a dispute
over the Court's jurisdiction, the matter shall be settled by the
decision of the Court. The amendment had been discussed in the
executive sessions of the Foreign Relations Committee following
the public hearings, but Senator Thomas had succeeded in per-
suading the committee not to add it to S. Res. 196. Of course,
Senator Connally, or any other Senator, would be free to offer
the amendment to the resolution on the floor of the Senate during
the ratification debate.
It was not the intention of the leadership of the Senate, at
the time the Committee report was fied, to call up S. Res. 196 for
Senate action during the remainder of the Second Session of the
79th Congress if it could be avoided. This parliamentary strategy
was the result of views held by Senators Connally, Vandenberg,
Austin, Barkley, and others, which they expressed in private
conversations with other Senators. They felt that the time was
not ripe to press this issue in the Senate while Russia was still
adamantly opposed to binding herself to the compulsory jurisdic-
tion of the Court, and while the United Nations itself was in the
early stages of demonstrating that it could effectively and de-
pendably function in respect to the powers and duties already
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14
Akron Law Review, Vol. 4 [1972], Iss. 1, Art. 8
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol4/iss1/8
INTERNATIONAL LAW
assigned to it by the Charter, as Vandenberg had pointed out.
They believed that more time should elapse, and hoped that S.
Res. 196 would not be called up before the next session of Con-
gress.
When Senator Thomas told me of the strategy of the Senate
leadership in respect to S. Res. 196, I decided, with the full ap-
proval of Senator Thomas, to watch for the first opportunity to
move to make S. Res. 196 the pending business of the Senate.
The chance came late in the afternoon of July 31, 1946.
After the Senate recessed that evening, Senators Vanden-
berg, Barkley, and Austin suggested to me that I withdraw my
motion the next day. They expressed concern that a debate in
the Senate on S. Res. 196 might create difficulties for Secretary
of State Byrnes who was then in Paris conducting negotiations at
the Foreign Ministers' Peace talks. The next morning, I received
a radiogram from Secretary Byrnes commending my motion
and urging its early passage. I immediately showed Secretary
Byrnes's radiogram to Senator Vandenberg and Senator Barkley;
they in turn talked to other Senate leaders about it. By the time
the Senate convened for the session of August first, there was full
agreement that Senator Thomas, as chairman of the Foreign Re-
lations Subcommittee that had conducted the hearings on S. Res.
196, should open the debate in behalf of the committee.
Senator Thomas argued a brilliant case in support of accept-
ing the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court. In part, he said,
The question is, Mr. President, why should any nation
with a clear conscience, be afraid to take its case before the
bar of international justice? Why should any nation which
believes in government by law hesitate to accept the impar-
tial judgment of the Court? Why should any nation, great
or small, which wants to be fair in its dealings with others,
avoid the settlement of legitimate grievances which other
nations may have? 21
... To be sure, the United States has been a member of the
Court ever since the United Nations Charter went into effect.
But membership itself is only a halfhearted beginning. If
the member states can flout the Court and can refuse to sub-
mit their differences to it, a regime of law in the interna-
tional community can never be realized.
Compulsory jurisdiction is thus the real test of our loyal-
ty, if we want the Court to succeed, for it is axiomatic that
no court can possibly function with full effectiveness unless
21 92 Cong. Rec. 10614 (1946).
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it has jurisdiction over the parties to a dispute, as well as
over the subject matter. 22
• . .The declaration would not confer upon the Court juris-
diction over matters which are essentially within the domes-
tic jurisdiction of the United States. This limitation is in con-
formity with the principle expressed in article 2 of the Char-
ter: "Nothing contained in the present Charter shall author-
ize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are
essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or
shall require the members to submit such matters to settle-
ment under the present Charter." 23
Throughout the debate, Senator Thomas and other Senators
stressed that paragraph 6 of article 36 of the Court Statute vest-
ed sole authority in the Court to settle any dispute over the
jurisdiction of the Court by a decision of the Court. It was the
inherent jurisdictional authority of the Court that the Connally
amendment to S. Res. 196 proposed to deny to the Court. S. Res.
196 contained a section which read, "Provided, that such decla-
ration shall not apply to
a. disputes the solution of which the parties shall intrust
to other tribunals by virtue of agreements already in exist-
ence or which may be concluded in the future; or
b. disputes with regard to matters which are essentially
within the domestic jurisdiction of the United States."
The Connally amendment added the words "as determined
by the United States" to item b, above, thereby giving to the
United States the right to refuse to submit to the compulsory
jurisdiction of the Court in any case which the United States
deemed that its domestic jurisdiction was involved.
It was a crippling amendment which went counter to all of
the advice, testimony, and writings of international law author-
ities who urged the adoption of S. Res. 196 by the Senate. For
example, Judge Manley 0. Hudson, who for years was a World
Court Judge, had written in his book, "The Permanent Court of
International Justice" at page 471, about the suggestion that a
reservation on domestic issues be made a condition to accepting
obligatory jurisdiction of the Court, "It is difficult to see what is
accomplished by this exclusion; if a dispute relates to questions
which fall within exclusively national jurisdiction, it does not fall
within one of the classes enumerated in paragraph 2 of article
22 Id. at 10614.
23 Id. at 10615.
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36.... No State can set itself up as the final judge of what inter-
national law leaves to its own jurisdiction."
Opponents of the Connally amendment pointed out that its
adoption would provide each country subsequently involved in
a dispute with the United States with the same escape from a
decision by the Court on the issue of jurisdiction by alleging that
the case brought against it by the United States involved that
country's domestic jurisdiction. Senator Thomas covered this,
A second major limitation on the jurisdiction conferred
arises from the condition of reciprocity. This is again speci-
fied in the resolution in the language of the statute, the per-
tinent phrase being as follows: "recognizing . . . in relation
to any other state accepting the same obligation, the juris-
diction of the International Court of Justice." Jurisdiction
is thus conferred only as among states filing declarations. In
addition, the similar phrase in the statute of the Permanent
Court of International Justice was interpreted by the Court
as meaning that any limitation imposed by a state in its grant
of jurisdiction thereby also became available to any other
state with which it might become involved in proceedings,
even though the second state had not specifically imposed the
limitation.2 4
In opposing the Connally amendment I pointed out that
It must be kept in mind that the thing we are really aim-
ing at is the long-range problem of bringing the entire world
under the rule of law. It seems clear that if this rule is to
be achieved, the participation of the United States is essen-
tial. We have no assurances as to what the consequences of
this achievement might be but we entertain the hope, as the
Under-Secretary of State said during the committee hearing,
that this may prove to be a long, and even a decisive step,
toward crossing that line which separates world disorder
from a world at peace. We are, therefore, attempting by this
method to achieve a very high goal, and it is necessary to
consider the aspects of the problem from this point of view.
If the United States reserves to itself the power to decide
an important jurisdictional question, we must act on the as-
sumption that the other states in the world will do like-
wise.25
Senator Connally, in support of his amendment, contended,
... I think we have the right to adhere 100 percent, if we
choose, and we have the right not to adhere at all. There-
fore, as between those two extremes, we have a perfect right
to adopt an amendment of this character, because the Char-
24 Id. at 10691.
25 92 Cong. Rec. 10684 (1946).
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ter provides that domestic questions may not be considered.
The Charter provides that the United Nations have no juris-
diction over domestic questions. But under the Charter the
Court might decide that immigration was an international
question. It might decide that tariffs were an international
question. It might decide that the navigation of the Panama
Canal was an international question. It is pretty close to it.
It might decide that the regulation of tolls through the Canal
was an international question. So I submit the amendment
and ask that it be printed and lie on the table.26
Mr. President, at San Francisco, when we adopted the
Charter, our delegation opposed compulsory jurisdiction at
that time, and favored the provisions which remitted the
matter to the will of each nation, so that each nation could
accept or could reject compulsory jurisdiction.
Under the present Charter, the United States has the
option of accepting compulsory jurisdiction or the option of
not accepting it and simply relying on special provisions re-
garding each case which might be accepted by the Court.
So within those extremes we have a perfect right to
stipulate the extent of our agreement as to compulsory juris-
diction.
My amendment is tantamount to saying to the Interna-
tional Court and to the members of the United Nations that
we will accept jurisdiction on all questions set forth in the
Charter and in the treaty, except that we will not acceptjurisdiction on questions which we deem to be purely domes-
tic issues.
27
Several Senators have argued that by this amendment
the United States would put itself in the position of corrupt-
ly and improperly claiming that a question is domestic in
nature when it is not, thereby taking advantage of an inter-
national dispute and saying that since the question is domes-
tic, we will not abide by the decision of the Court. Mr.
President, I have more faith in my Government than that.
I do not believe the United States would adopt a subterfuge,
a pretext, or a pretense in order to block the judgment of
the Court on any such grounds.28
Mr. President, I am in favor of the International Court
of Justice. I am in favor of the United Nations, but I am also
for the United States of America. I do not want to surrender
the sovereignty or the prestige of the United States with re-
spect to any question which may be merely domestic in char-
acter, and contained within the boundaries of the Republic.
So, Mr. President, I hope the Senate will agree to the
26 92 Cong. Rec. 10624 (1946).
27 92 Cong. Rec. 10694-95 (1946).
28 Id. at 10695.
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amendment, and then it will be in position to act affirmative-
ly on the resolution.
2 9
At no time in the debate did Senator Connally and the other
supporters of his amendment attack the provision of the Court
Statute that any dispute over the Court's jurisdiction is to be
settled by a decision of the Court. In essence the Connally
amendment was a political veto by the United States, applicable
to any case involving the United States, upon the right of the
World Court, as granted by the Charter, to settle any dispute
involving its jurisdiction by a decision of the Court. Neverthe-
less, in the face of an overwhelming body of expert opinion, the
Senate adopted the Connally amendment by a vote of 51 to 12.
Then, on August 2, 1946, it adopted S. Res. 196 amended, pro-
viding for limited acceptance by the United States of the Com-
pulsory Jurisdiction of the World Court. The vote was 60 to 2.
Until all nations, including the United States and Russia,
are willing to accept the binding jurisdiction of the World Court
over disputes between nations in accordance with the jurisdic-
tional procedures and prerogatives vested in the Court by the
United Nations Charter, international law as a bridge to inter-
national justice will continue to fail in its peace-keeping poten-
tials. Time has proved that the United States, through the Con-
nally amendment, has weakened the effectiveness of the World
Court as a bridge to international justice. Its repeal by the
United States Senate is long overdue.
It is a grim historic reality that the United Nations Charter
as a bridge to international justice leading to world peace has
been weakened in many other respects since its signatories
pledged to abide by its purposes, principles and procedures. We
Americans are a proud people; indeed, I would have it no other
way for there is much in which to take pride. Nevertheless, we
cannot be proud of our non-compliance with the peace-keeping
objectives and procedures of the United Nations Charter par-
ticularly in respect to our war-making in Southeast Asia. It is
no excuse for our international outlawry in Southeast Asia to
argue that Russia and China have also breached the Charter. So
they have, but we should have kept ourselves in a position to
lead the way in bringing all nations before the bar of interna-
national justice by using the procedures of the United Nations
29 Id. at 10696.
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Charter. Instead we, too, have violated the peace-keeping pro-
visions of the Charter, and we are continuing to do so.
It is said that it no longer makes any difference what mis-
takes the United States may have made in becoming involved
in the war in Vietnam in the first place, because the fact is we
are in it, and now we must see it through. This rationalization
for our many violations of the United Nations Charter and other
tenets of international law, as well as our own Constitution, will
never be accepted by other nations who have disapproved of our
military intervention in Vietnam from the beginning.
The basis for that intervention was laid down in 1953, at the
advent of the Eisenhower Administration, when the Eisenhower-
Nixon-Dulles military containment policy for Asia and other un-
derdeveloped areas of the world was initiated. This military con-
tainment policy was based on the assumption that the United
States had the unilateral right and duty to stop the spread of
Communism. It was the foreign-policy incubator that hatched
the Vietnam War. Secretary of State Dulles, speaking for the
Eisenhower Administration, threatened massive retaliation
against any Communist country that sought to spread its sphere
of influence in Asia; or, for that matter, in other underdeveloped
areas of the world.
One of the major foreign policy programs of Secretary Dulles
was that the United States Government commit itself to a large
number of security pacts under which we pledged military sup-
port to nations that became involved in military difficulties with
their neighbors. History undoubtedly will charge Secretary
Dulles with a major responsibility for our forty-two security
pacts spread over the far-flung regions of the globe. Nehru
called it, "Pactomania." Some say it was an attempt of our Gov-
ernment to supplant the shattered British military lifeline around
the world with a United States global military lifeline. It forms
the basis for criticisms of the United States as a nation that is
bent on a policy of military imperialism which is an attempt to
exercise a dominating influence over weaker nations.
This policy has taken the United States outside the family
of nations, as represented by the United Nations, because it re-
lies on the unilateral military power of the United States as the
controlling instrument for enforcing the peace of the world. It
does not rely upon the multilateral obligations of the signatories
to the United Nations to use the peace-keeping procedures set
Winter 1971
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out in the Charter for enforcing the peace whenever it is threat-
ened.
The foregoing statements are broad brush strokes which
paint a picture of our illegal military intervention into Southeast
Asia. Criticisms of our government's war-making policies in
Vietnam have been increasing throughout the world and at home.
Our government is charged with many violations of the articles
of warfare supposedly binding upon civilized nations.
President Franklin Roosevelt recognized the inevitable re-
sults of any attempt on the part of powerful military nations to
maintain military strongholds in Asia. He proposed at the his-
toric Teheran Conference that all the western powers and all the
Asian powers, including China, should join in establishing an
international trusteeship for all of Indochina, designed to bring
about a multi-nation cooperative program that would seek to
raise the economic standard of living of the people of Indochina
and bring to them the concomitant benefits of literacy and the
opportunity to develop their own self-determined policies in re-
spect to their way of life, economic and political.
Unfortunately, his proposal was opposed by Churchill who
pointed out that the result would be that England would have to
give up India. Roosevelt agreed, but he suggested that it would
be better for England to give up India voluntarily rather than
involuntarily. France opposed Roosevelt's Indochina trusteeship
proposal because she, too, would have to sacrifice her valuable
possessions in Indochina. Here, too, Roosevelt agreed that would
be one of the results, but he predicted that if France did not
withdraw from Indochina, she would eventually be defeated in
a war in that area of the world. Although Roosevelt's dream of
multi-nation peace-keeping procedures for Indochina did not ma-
terialize, his dream of a United Nations-a multi-nation peace-
keeping organization worldwide in scope-did become a reality
shortly after his death when the United Nations Charter was
signed at San Francisco.
In these times of international crises, we cannot escape the
major foreign policy question that confronts the leaders of every
nation signatory to the United Nations Charter: Can the nations
of the world, in the interest of their own security and survival
in this nuclear age, permit any great military power, or any com-
bination of military powers, to engage in military interventions
which threaten the peace anywhere in the world? Of course the
answer is, "No, they cannot," if mankind is to look forward to
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the century ahead with any hope of avoiding a nuclear war.
Russia, China, the United States, as well as any alliance of mili-
tary powers, must be called to a world accounting whenever they
engage in military interventions in violation of their obligations
under the United Nations Charter.
Therefore, it is important that we re-examine the meanings
of the United Nations Charter and its peace-keeping procedures
to which each of the signatories is solemnly pledged to support.
Any re-examination must show how important it is for the
United States to make amends without further delay for our
illegal conduct, in relation to our international law obligations,
that has characterized our interventions in Southeast Asia since
1953.
An examination of the Charter shows that our country has
failed to submit to the Security Council of the United Nations
a resolution calling upon the United Nations to assume complete
jurisdiction over the settlement of the Indochina War with a
pledge that the United States would abide by the results of the
United Nations adjudication.
People say, "Isn't the United Nations too divided, too weak
to settle a big war such as the Vietnam War?" I answered this
argument many times over the years on the floor of the Senate
as I urged our country to get back inside the framework of the
United Nations Charter. My answer is that the job of the United
Nations is to keep peace.
Instead of supporting that precept, the United States set out
to keep peace alone. Instead of bringing peace to Vietnam, we
have contributed to the escalation of the war with its resulting
increase in death and destruction. We cannot keep peace acting
alone, as the course of this war amply demonstrates. We cannot
keep peace as policeman to the world because other nations do
not accept one country's idea of peaceful solutions, any more
than they accepted Britain's idea of world order, or Germany's
or Napoleon's. The United States went into this war without
exhausting all of the avenues of peaceful settlement open to it
by membership in the United Nations. We by-passed the United
Nations.
Just as I am unimpressed by our self-flattering theory about
serving as policeman to the world, so I am unimpressed by the
timid ones at the United Nations who prefer to shun their re-
sponsibilities under the Charter because it is the United States
that is involved in the war. We are at the present time the
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world's most powerful nation, and by far its wealthiest. Appar-
ently, no one wants to reprimand, or chastise, or bring under
international control the goose that lays the golden egg.
We are pouring out billions of dollars in foreign aid, over
$142 billion since 1946 into some 93 nations, exclusive of war
costs in Vietnam. Therefore, I think it is unrealistic to assume
that the United Nations will take jurisdiction over our war-
making in Vietnam unless the United States is willing to pledge
that it will abide by United Nations jurisdiction. We should offer
a resolution calling for a cease-fire order by the United Nations
and asking the United Nations to enforce the peace, based upon
our pledge that we will abide by its determinations. Unless we
do this, there is not much hope for re-establishing the United
Nations as an effective force for peace through justice and inter-
national law.
We would have our share in helping to frame the determi-
nations, but whatever they are, we ought to make clear, before
the fact, that we will abide by a peace settlement as determined
by the United Nations. If the United States is found to be in
violation of the United Nations Charter because of the war in
Vietnam, so is every signatory that has done nothing to institute
United Nations action to take jurisdiction over the war.
There are many forms that jurisdiction could take. The Se-
curity Council could call for reconvening the Geneva Conference.
It could suggest the same membership, or the addition of what-
ever countries it thinks appropriate. Or the Security Council
could refer the matter to the General Assembly, if it is stymied
by a veto. It could refer many international law issues involved
in the war to the World Court for advisory opinions. The United
States, however, should insist that the General Assembly act if
the Security Council fails to do so.
It should be remembered that on September 24, 1960, after
the Security Council had ceased to deal with the Congo problem,
the General Assembly, by a vote of 70-0, strongly supported by
the United States, authorized United Nations peace-keeping
intervention in the Congo. This was in accordance with Articles
10, 11, and 12 of the Charter. In the unlikely event that the
Security Council should not accept a request to exercise binding
jurisdiction over settling the war in Vietnam in accordance with
its authority under the Charter, then the General Assembly, as
it did in the Congo case, could exercise jurisdiction over bringing
to an end this serious threat to world peace.
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As far back as September 23, 1965, I inserted in the Con-
gressional Record a memorandum of law prepared by a distin-
guished Lawyers' Committee on American Policy Toward Viet-
nam. I am presently Honorary Chairman of this Lawyers' Com-
mittee, which since the preparation of its first memorandum op-
posing on legal grounds our country's military intervention in
Vietnam, has become a permanent organization devoted to con-
tinued analysis of legal violations of international, as well as con-
stitutional law, within our government's foreign policies. In a
second legal memorandum, submitted to President Johnson on
February 25, 1966, this Lawyers' Committee on American Policy
Toward Vietnam documented its answer to a memorandum by
the United States State Department, which sought to rationalize
an alleged legal basis for United States action against North
Vietnam.
The answer of the Lawyers' Committee to the State Depart-
ment was endorsed by many recognized international law author-
ities, including Quincy Wright, of the University of Virginia;
Wolfgang Friedmann, of Columbia University; Thomas I. Emer-
son, of Yale; Richard A. Falk, of Princeton; Norman Malcolm, of
Cornell; D. F. Fleming, of Vanderbilt; David Haber, of Rutgers;
Roy M. Mersky, of the University of Texas; William G. Rice, of
the University of Wisconsin; Chancellor Robert M. MacIver, of
the New School for Social Research; Robert C. Stevenson, of
Idaho State University; Alexander W. Rudzinsky, of Columbia;
Darrell Randell, of the American University in Washington,
D.C.; Wallace McClure and William W. VanAlstyne, both from
Duke University and the World Rule of Law Center.
For the reasons documented in the memorandum, the Law-
yers' Committee stated that it had reached the regrettable but
inescapable conclusion that "the actions of the United States in
Vietnam contravene the essential provisions of the United Na-
tions Charter, to which we are bound by treaty; violate the
Geneva Accords, which we pledged to observe; are not sanc-
tioned by the treaty creating the Southeast Asia Treaty Organi-
zation; and violate our own Constitution and the system of
checks and balances which is the heart of it, by the prosecution
of the war in Vietnam without a Congressional Declaration of
War." 30
30 112 Cong. Rec. 4166 (1966).
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The Lawyers' Committee called attention to the fact that the
Charter of the United Nations is a presently effective treaty bind-
ing upon the Government of the United States because it is the
"supreme law of the land."
The Committee said:
... Indeed, the Charter constitutes the cornerstone of a world
system of nations which recognizes that peaceful relations,
devoid of any use of force or threats of force, are the funda-
mental legal relations between nations. The following pro-
visions of the Charter are relevant:
a. All members shall refrain in their international rela-
tions from the threat or use of force against the territorial
integrity or political independence of any state or in any
other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United
Nations.
b. The Security Council shall determine the existence
of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of
aggression, and shall make recommendations or shall decide
what measures shall be taken to maintain or restore inter-
national peace and security.
It is thus plain that signatory members of the United
Nations Charter are barred from resorting to force unilat-
erally and that only the Security Council is authorized to
determine the measures to be taken to maintain or restore
international peace.3 '
The memorandum then proceeds in great detail to discuss
the violations by the United States of the United Nations Charter
and the Geneva Accords; it also discusses the inapplicability of
the SEATO treaty as far as providing the United States with any
justification for following a unilateral war-making policy in
Southeast Asia. The memorandum calls attention to the fact that
both President Eisenhower and Secretary Dulles pledged to the
world that our country, although it did not sign the Geneva
Accords, would respect the tenets of the Geneva Treaty as tenets
of international law. Unfortunately, as the memorandum points
out, our Government has, time and time again, violated all of the
major articles of the Geneva Treaty.
It may be, although I doubt it, that a silent majority in our
country today supports our war policies in South Vietnam, but
who would contend that a mistaken silent majority can make
an illegal course of action legal. The responsibilities of citizen-
31 111 Cong. Rec. 24904 (1965).
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statesmanship call upon us to seek to change a mistaken public
viewpoint of the silent majority into a viewpoint based upon fact
and legality.
Carl Schurz, in a speech in the United States Senate in 1872,
stated the responsibility of citizen-statesmanship very clearly for
each one of us when he uttered those now historical words, "Our
country right or wrong: when right, to be kept right; when
wrong, to be put right." To be put right in respect to our wrong-
doing in Vietnam, our country should return to the peace-
keeping procedures within the Charter of the United Nations, to
which our country pledged itself when, in keeping with our Con-
stitutional processes, we ratified the United Nations Charter.
The task of each of us is to help build the bridge to international
justice by strengthening International Law through the United
Nations.
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